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[F]or those with a sense of urban history, the tragedy of New Orleans is 
... about a lost opportunity [for the welfare of the city's inhabitants]. 
All of the g reat challenges that confront the 21st-century city ... are 
crystallized in New Orleans.' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article chronicles the perplexing asymmetry between New 
Orleans' devastation by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the state's 
subsequent adoption of constitutional amendments2 that threaten to 
cripple the eminent domain power as a pillar of New Orleans' post­
hurricane recovery. 
I. Nicolai Ouroussoff, Reflections: New Orleans and China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2008 (Week in Review), at 1 .  
2 .  2006 La. Acts 851 (amending LA. CONST. art. I,  § 4(B)); 2006 La. Acts 859 
(adding LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(H)). Because there was a third constitutional resolution, 2006 
La. Acts 853 (amendi n g  LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(G)), the section originally designated 4(G) by 
Acts 859 was redesignated 4(H). For the complete text of article I, section 4, see infra 
Appendix. 
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How did this divergence occur? What does it tell us about Keio v. 
City of New London,3 the United States Supreme Court decision to 
which the amendments are a response, about libertarian objections to 
the eminent domain power, and about the adequacy of redevelopment 
discourse as cities shift from an earlier era's focus on large-scale slum 
clearance to more modest and diversely targeted current goals? 
The drama is national as well as local. Elements found in 
Louisiana's amendments were proposed by property rights groups and 
adopted elsewhere in a number of other states. 
Keio is conventionally portrayed as holding that the transfer to a 
private party of unblighted expropriated property in aid of New 
London's "economic development" satisfies the federal constitution's 
"public use" requirement. Oral argument before the Supreme Court 
defined "economic development" more precisely, however, as a 
process enabling government to favor one property owner (the 
transferee) over another (the condemnee) solely because the use to 
which the former proposes to put the property promises the city a 
greater tax yield.4 
Conventional analysis also b ottoms its assessment of the Keio 
outcome on whether or not it comports with Bennan v. Parker,5 the 
Court's leading eminent domain/urban renewal precedent. In doing so, 
however, it pursues a false scent because the two cases are misaligned 
in their facts and in their legal issues. Superficially, they appear 
factually similar because in neither instance were the litigated parcels 
blighted. Unlike Keio, however, Bennan featured a conventional slum 
redevelopment scenario that posed the narrow and, in retrospect, 
relatively uninteresting question o f  whether an unblighted property 
3. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
4. This refinement occurred during the follqwing exchange involving Justices Scalia 
and O'Connor and City of New London Attorney Wesley Horton: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: I just want to take property from people who are paying less 
taxes and give it to people who are paying more taxes. That would be a public use, 
wouldn't it? 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: For example, Motel 6 and the city thinks, well, if we had 
a Ritz-Carl ton, we would have higher taxes. Now, is that okay? 
MR. HORTON: Yes, Your Honor. That would be okay. 
342 LANDMARK BRlEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNlTED STATES: 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 2004 TERM SUPPLEMENT 722 (Gerhard Casper & Kathleen M. Sullivan 
eds., 2005). 
5. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) . 
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located in a sea of blighted properties may be expropriated along with 
them.6 
The legal issues differed as well. In Berman, the question posed 
and affirmatively answered is whether a "public use" is ser ved by 
eminent domain-based redevelopment undertaken to remedy a 
substantive urban planning problem-here slum creation and 
clearance-when one of the properties taken was not itself blighted. 
But in Keio, the majority and concurring opinions, like the litigants 
themselves, untethered the power's deploy ment from blight 
remediation or any other substantive planning concern, asking instead 
whether or not government's assessment of its fiscal needs alone 
warrants denying a private property owner the autonomy over property 
that, in its current use, is other wise unproblematic. Under this 
misguided perspective, eminent domain-based redevelopment is freed 
from the discipline demanded by a sound linkage to the resolution of 
substantive planning problems, and is transformed, in effect, into an 
auxiliary of the taxing power. 
This disconnect triggered Justice O'Connor's riposte-previewed 
in her questioning during oral argument-that, following Keio, 
"[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a 
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a 
factory."1 Had New London linked its use of eminent domain to a 
6. The inclusion of relatively few properties that do not share the characteristic 
features of most of the properties within a district established upon the basis of the latter's 
features is commonplace in American land use planning. Illustrative are properties that do 
not share the historic or architectural features defining most of an historic district's structures. 
The former, however, are no less subject to the design regulations than the latter because the 
regulations address what the Louisiana courts have termed the "tout ensemble" of the 
district's urban tissue. See City ofNew Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798, 801-02 (La. 1953); 
Maher v. City ofNew Orleans, 222 So. 2d 608, 614 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1969). Similarly, many 
states expressly authorize localities to include nonblighted properties within larger 
redevelopment districts of mostly blighted properties when doing so is necessary or 
appropriate to secure the districts' planned redevelopment goals. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE 
ANN. § l .08(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (providing that nonblighted structures may be taken 
if seventy percent of area's parcel's are blighted); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205(c)(i) (West 
Supp. 2008) (providing that nonblighted structures may be taken if majority of area's 
structures are blighted or represent a majority of the area). 
7. 545 U.S. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition to inciting the assault on 
"economic developmenf' found in virtually all post-Keio measures, Justice O'Connor's 
distress over the Court's elimination of substantive planning concerns is widely shared by 
commentators, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand· Economic Development 
TakingsAfierKelo, 15 SUP. Cr. ECON. REv. 183, 191 (2007) ("[T]his rationale can be used to 
condemn virtually any property for transfer to a private commercial enterprise."), and by 
judges, including those writing prior to the Keio decision, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 
684 N.W2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004) ("[The] 'economic benefit' rationale would validate 
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity."). 
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substantive planning concem,8 she would have approved both 
expropriation and the private-to-private transfer following it.9 
The Keio majority invited states troubled by its action to address 
the issue as a matter of state law.10 Nothing less than a national land 
use seminar· followed in which virtually every state legislature visited 
the question, and at least forty-two enacted post-Keio measures of one 
kind or another.11 
Louisiana's constitutional provision is one of these measures. It 
was adopte d  twenty-four months after the Keio d ecision, which 
preceded Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by only two months. Part IT of 
this Article utilizes the storms' devastation and the City of New 
Orleans' recovery program to document the essential role assigned to 
eminent domain in the latter. 
Part III moves from New Orleans to the national stage to review 
the states' various post-Keio approaches. It highlights a pattern, the 
"anti-Keio format," which tightens the eminent domain power's ambit 
well beyond the limits proposed b y  Justice O'Connor. Louisiana's 
constitutional amendments can plausibly be claimed to align with this 
approach. An assessment of the format's structure, moreover, reveals 
its inadequacies when measured against the public need created by the 
nation's largest natural disaster as well as by the less dramatic if 
equally necessary regular requirements of urban systems management. 
Part IV returns to Louisiana to place the state's post-Keio 
measure within the national context. It details why the measure will 
shut down eminent domain's use as currently envisaged in New 
Orleans' recovery program if Louisiana courts construe the measure as 
an anti-Keio format clone. 
Part V offers four conclusions. The first is that Keio erred when 
it unlinked eminent domain from the solution of substantive urban 
system problems. This reasoning trivialized the power's redevelop­
ment role, needlessly triggered post-Keio outrage, and gave rise to the 
fantasy that the matter could be set aright by banning "economic 
development" as a "public use," or, in Louisiana's case, as a "public 
8. The concern, in her view, could not fall short ofan "affirmative harm." Keio, 545 
U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
9. Id 
10. Id at 489 (majority opinion). 
I I. For an inventory of state post-Keio responses, see CASTLE COAL., 50 STATE 
REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (2007), http:// 
www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report.card/50_State_Report.pdf; Nat'! Conference 
of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain 2007 State Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/n atres/emindomainleg07.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2008). 
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purpose."12 This Article advocates reestablishing the linkag e  as the 
central inquiry posed by the public-use criterion.u 
The second is that the anti-Keio format's preference for a closed­
ended, pre-twentieth-century definition of the eminent domain power's 
scope is driven by considerations that aggressively ignore the public 
necessities disclosed by New Orleans' faltering recovery efforts, and, 
more broadly, by the urban systems needs of America's cities generally. 
The third is that the initial wave of post-Keio measures merely 
commences the states' effort to wrestle with Keio. A second wave 
awaits in which the courts will serve as co-authors of the many first­
wave measures that, lacking authoritative construction, admit to an 
array of conflicting interpretations. I anticipate a third wave as well, as 
legislatures in other states revise their handiwork to avoid the qualms 
and misgivings of the kind now plaguing New Orleans' stalled 
recovery program. 
My final observation adopts Justice Brandeis's metaphor that 
views each of the post-Keio responses as the work of an individual 
state "laboratory" engaged in "novel social and economic 
experiments."14 The coming years will provide an experiential basis for 
determining the wisdom and practicability for eminent domain-based 
redevelopment of the anti-Keio format as contrasted with more flexible 
approaches that are no longer confined simply by the slum and blight 
clearance goals of the earlier Bennan era. 
II. KATRINA, RITA, AND THE NEW ORLEANS RECOVERY PROGRAM 
Katrina and Rita pinpointed Louisiana and New Orleans as their 
Ground Zero. A few facts portray the storms' ferocity. Deaths: 1527 .15 
Land area damaged: 90,000 square miles.16 Homes destroyed or made 
inhabitable: 300,000.11 Estimated economic loss: $125-150 billion.18 
12. For purposes of this Article, Louisiana Constitution article I, section4(B)(l)'s 
phrase "public purpose" is interchangeable with the phrase "public use" found in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
13. It also raises for another day a question of novel impression posed by Kelo's facts 
but ignored by the Court and litigants: namely whether or not the criterion is satisfied if a 
city condemns property located in a project area in part or in whole to remedy an off-project 
planning problem. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
14. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311  ( 1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
15. DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 
17 (2006). 
16. id This area is equivalent in size to the area of the United Kingdom. 
17. Id In New Orleans, 108,731 households-fifty percent of the city's population­
lived in houses with over four feet of flood water. BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK COMM'N, 
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Post-storm 2005 unemployment rate: 12.5%.19 New Orleans' post­
storm population loss: roughly two-thirds.20 Estimated cost of 
restoring New Orleans' public infrastructure: $14.4 billion.21 
The New Orleans Mayor's Office of Recovery Management 
(ORM) directs the city's recovery program in an effort that draws 
heavily from three prior plans, the most detailed of which is the 
Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), which received legislative 
approval in 2006.22 A necessarily brief review of these complex efforts 
illuminates the city's post-Katrina strategies. It also reveals key 
components of the urban redevelopment enterprise that American 
cities routinely pursue, albeit under less harried circumstances. In 
addition to considerations bearing on "economic development" and 
private transfers of expropriated property, these components include 
government's role as urban system manager, the respective 
contributions of government and the private sector in public/private 
redevelopment partnerships, and eminent domain's place within this 
interaction. 
A. Urban Redevelopment's Multiple Pwposes and Sectors 
New Orleans' recovery planning seeks to prevent ''uncoordinated, 
dysfunctional redevelopment; an ineffective infrastructure policy; and 
ACTION PLAN FOR NEW ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CIT Y  fig.5 (2006), 
http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/jan/CityPlanningFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter BNOB 
Plan]. 
18. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 15, at 17. 
19. Id Short-term, over 203,000 jobs were lost in New Orleans. BNOB Plan, supra 
note 17, fig.5. 
20. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 15, at 17. The Farber/Chen figures are calculated on 
the basis of the approximate ratio of New Orleans ' population in 2000 (485,000) to that 
figure in January 2006 (145,000). 
21. NEW ORLEANS CMTY. SUPPORT FOUND. & CMTY. SUPPORT 0RG., THE UNIFIED 
NEW ORLEANS PLAN: CITYWIDE STRATEGIC RECOVERY AND REBUILDING PLAN § 6.1.2, tbl.6.1 
(2006), http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.com!uploads/UNOP-FI NAL-PLAN-April-2007-
15744.pdf [hereinafter UNOP]. 
22. The other plans are the BNOB Plan, supra note 17, and the New Orleans 
Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (October 2006) (also known as the "Lambert Plan"), 
available at http://www.nolanrp.com/Data/Neighborhood//NOLA_NRP _SUMMARY.pdf. 
Integrating the proposals of the ULI, Lambert, and UNOP, Edward Blakely, Director of the 
Mayor's Office of Recovery Management, announced a seventeen-district recovery program, 
the progress of which is available at http://neworleans.iprojweb.com/basedefault.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2008). Approximately $1.1 billion will be committed to restore capital 
improvements, streets and streetscapes, and other infrastructure enhancement projects within 
the seventeen districts. NORA's expropriation powers and financial support will be employed 
principally in aid of the revitali:zation of these districts. 
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... a greatly impaired urban fabric."23 UNOP projects a staged ten­
year recovery program with a $14.4 billion estimated price tag.'" 
UNOP envisages allocation of the latter sum to ten recovery sectors: 
flood protection; infrastructure and utilities; transportation; housing; 
economic development; healthcare; education; historic preservation 
and urban design; environment; and community services (including 
public safety, recreation and library, and municipal and cultural 
services).25 Note that only one of the ten sectors is tenned "economic 
development," which UNOP identifies as  restoration of the city's ports, 
tourist industry, and energy sector, and development of a downtown 
medical district. 26 
On its face, UNOP conceives urban revitalization as encompassing 
a great deal more than "economic development," whether undertaken 
to cope with a natural disaster or, more routinely, to improve or stave 
off the decline of the city's urban s ystems. UNOP's community 
services component clarifies, moreover, that renewal efforts span 
social as well as physical development components. 
B. Urban Redevelopment: The Public Side of the Public/Pn·vate 
Partnership 
New Orleans is also a partner with the private sector. Reserving 
discussion of its use of eminent domain for the next section, the city's 
contributions to this public/private partnership are basically threefold. 
It sets the public agenda through the planning activities described 
earlier. It finances and provides the public infrastructure required to 
support an efficiently functioning private land market. Finally, it must 
insure that its land use regulatory framework correctly tracks the city's 
post-Katrina footprint. 
Storm-compelled reductions or modifications in the desired 
levels and location of the city's pre-Katrina population insure that the 
city will not duplicate its pre-Katrina footprint.21 Like the other two 
23. URBAN LAND INST., A STRATEGY FOR REBUILDING NEW ORLEANS NOVEMBER 12-
18, 2005, at 11 (draft report Dec. 10, 2005), http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/searchab le/ 
reports/ULI_Draft_N ew _ Orleans_Report.pdf. 
24. UNOP,supmnote21,§§ 1.1.3,6.1.1.3. 
25. Id §§ 2.4-2.4.10. 
26. Id §§ 4.5-4.5.5. 
27. The BNOB Plan speaks candidly to the necessity of rearranging the city's land 
use, population, and infrastructure footprints: 
We must face the fact that there may have to be some consolidation of 
neighborhoods that have insufficient population to support the equitable and 
efficient delivery of services. . . . We have no choice but to be responsible with use 
2008] AMERICAN CITIES IN POST-KELO ERA 403 
plans, UNOP evaluates the city's planning districts on the basis of their 
vulnerability to repeat flooding, and it coordinates the scope, timing, 
and capacity levels of new or rebuilt infrastructure with policies that 
seek to balance the equitable treatment of all city neighborhoods with 
a stated preference for the "densification" and "clustering" of 
development and population in areas of acceptable flood risk.28 
C Urban Redevelopment· Eminent Domain and the Private Side of 
the Public/Private Partnership 
UNOP envisages government/private interaction as a symbiotic 
relationship. Government defines the development goals, finances 
public infrastructure, and provides a supportive regulatory structure. 
But it depends upon the private sector to finance and assume the 
private market risks of private construction.29 
of limited City resources. We must provide public facilities and services where 
population is concentrated so these resources can be used in the most equitable and 
efficient manner possible. 
BNOB Plan, supra note 17, at 12. 
As of June 2008, New Orleans had regained only seventy-two percent of its 2005 pre­
Katrina population (as measured by the number of households actively receiving mail). See 
BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX, ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THREE YEARS AFrER 
KATRINA 8 (2008), http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/NOLAindex/ESNew0rleanslndexAug 
08.pdf. New Orleans' 2000 population of 485,000 was down some 165,00 from a city whose 
infrastructure had once served a city of 650,000. See Frank S. Alexander, Land Reform in 
the Storms' Aftermath, 53 LOY. L. R.Ev. 727, 731 (2007). Evidence that the city's footprint is 
indeed changing appears in statistical updates showing that more than half of all active 
residences in New Orleans in June 2008 were located in the four planning districts least 
flooded by Katrina as compared with the thirty-nine percent of the city's households that 
lived in these districts pre-Katrina. See BROOKINGS INST., supra, at 8. Other planning 
districts in January 2008 recorded population levels as low as nineteen percent of their pre­
Katrina levels. Id at 18. 
28. UNOP, supra note 21, § 3.3.3 figs.3.4 & 3.5 (creating three "recovery policy 
areas" premised on degree of flood risk and likely repopulation rate). UNOP stresses the role 
of clustering and densification as agents of topographical shift in its observation that 
[a] more clustered pattern of resettlement will help the City and other agencies 
focus investments and upgrade public services and infrastructure to attract 
residents and businesses to reside near one another. A more clustered pattern of 
resettlement will reduce the guesswork among residents and businesses about their 
neighborhood's future viability, by restoring communities and reducing blight. It 
will also provide a guide to the City and other agencies to use in restoring 
infrastructure and services, and targeting investments to enhance infrastructure and 
services, and improve quality of life, which can stimulate additional investments. 
Id§ 3.3.3. 
29. Marc Mihaly observes that "cities or redevelopment agencies typically cannot 
accept market and development risk, and often cannot front high 'predevelopment' expenses, 
that is the costs of planners, economists, engineers, and attorneys necessary to work through 
the details of the project proposal; and they are ill suited to perform the vertical 
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Eminent domain tightens the public/private embrace because 
redevelopers, unlike energy or mining companies or landlocked 
property owners, are not traditional delegees of government's eminent 
domain power. They must rely instead on government to acquire and 
transfer redevelopment parcels to them. 
1. NORA and UNOP's Five Eminent Domain-Based Charges 
Under legislation approved one year prior to Katrina, the New 
Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) was granted the power to 
condemn both individual blighted parcels30 and land assemblages 
within entire "community improvement area[s]."31 NORA may 
transfer expropriated property to other private parties in both cases. •c 
Blighted areas are defined in the traditional urban renewal/slum 
clearance mode,33 while an individual blighted property must be 
adjudicated to warrant that status on the basis of a prior administrative 
determination. 34 
In view of this statutory authority, New Orleans recovery 
planning assigns NORA five principal tasks in its role as the city's lead 
property acquisition and transfer agency. The first35 is to serve as a 
depositary36 for parcels coming to it principally from the state's Road 
Home Program,37 from the city's tax adjudication program,38 and, most 
development." Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Pn.vate Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme 
Court: Keio v. City of New London, mTHE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS 41, 
58 (2005), available at http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10003.pdf. New Orleans· 
dependence on the private sector to implement the city's recovery goals is even more 
imperative in view of the sheer nwnber of its post-Katrina blighted parcels (71,000), its need 
to obtain program funds to acquire or maintain such properties through the sale of 
expropriated parcels to developers, the absence of governmental uses for all but a tiny 
fraction of them, and their need to be returned to active private use as a stimulant to 
neighborhood revitalization. See infra note 46 and accompany ing text. 
30. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.59 (Supp. 2008). 
31. Id§ 33:4720.58(A). 
32. Id § 33:4720.59(A)-(B) (individual blighted properties), § 33:4720.60(A)( l )  
(properties within community improvement districts). 
33. See id § 33:4720.58(A). The provision's language authorizing NORA to 
expropriate "any real property . . .  which it may deem necessary for or in connection with a 
community improvement plan" enables NORA to acquire unblighted parcels, such as that 
litigated in Bennan, in a district composed principally of blighted parcels. 
34. See id§ 33:4720.59(B). 
Id 
35. UNOP, supra note 21, § 5.4.4.3. 
36. UNOP places this depositary function under NORA's "land banking" authority. 
37. The Road Home Corporation (RHC) was established as a nonprofit corporation 
to acquire, hold, manage, and convey properties that it acquires from Louisiana homeowners 
who opt to sell their homes to it. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:600.63, 40:600.66. RHC's 
complex structure and functions are detailed in Alexander, supra note 27, at 735-37, and on 
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important, from NORA's own programs for the purchase or 
expropriation of blighted properties, which it anticipates will furnish 
most of the properties in its eventual inventory.39 In the early stages of 
recovery planning, New Orleans' mayor predicted that NORA would 
become the "'depository' for swaths of wrecked residential property.''4° 
His prediction was overtaken, however, by the doubts that Louisiana's 
pending constitutional amendments would soon pose for the effort.41 
NORA's second charge is to work with other city agencies to 
coordinate its acquisition-disposition program with their policies and 
responsibilities in the recovery effort.42 Its third is to employ eminent 
the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Web site located at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/. For the 
purposes of this Article, RHC is significant because NORA expects to have approximately 
5000 RHC properties transferred to it by 2010. Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, 
Staff Attorney, NORA, in New Orleans, La. (Sept. 17, 2008). 
38. Properties in tax arrears may be put up for auction in Louisiana. See LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § §  47:2186, 47:2251. If the properties fail to sell, they are transferred to pertinent 
parish or municipality. Acquisition of these properties in New Orleans is governed by 1'd. 
§ 47:2254. For a discussion of the program, including the serious title issues associated with 
tax adjudicated property, see Alexander, supra note 27, at 752-56. NORA has not been a 
successful bidder for tax adjudicated properties. Approximately 1500 such properties, 
however, have been transferred to NORA by other city agencies. Telephone Interview with 
John J. Marshall, supra note 37. 
3 9. Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, supm note 3 7. 
40. Frank Donze, Unlikely Agency Key to Rebirth, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), 
Oct. 11, 2006, a t  Al. 
4 1. Frank Alexander acknowledges these burdens in his excellent account ofNORA's 
land banking charge. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 755-57. Direct confirmation of the 
burdens from the chair of NORA's board, Herschel Abbott, appear in an e-mail exchange 
between Mr. Abbott and Professor David M arcello. Marcello had taken the position that the 
2006 amendments allow NORA only to expropriate blighted property, not to transfer it to the 
private sector for redevelopment, and further restrict NORA's acquisitions to individual 
blighted properties that were virtual public nuisances, thereby disabling it from designating 
corrununity improvement projects and assembling multiple parcels, blighted or otherwise. In 
consequence, Marcello states that "aggressive reliance [by NORA] on expropriation would 
be woefully ill-founded." David A. Marcello, Housing Redevelopment Strategies in the Jv.rike 
of Katrina and Anti-Keio Constitutional Amendments: Mapping a Path Through the 
Landscape of Disaster, 53 Lov. L. R.Ev. 763, 76 8 (2008). In his response, Mr. Abbott agreed 
with Professor Marcello-stating that NORA's eminent domain power would be used only 
"on a single house basis" "to get rid of crack houses and other public nuisances" and to 
acquire property that would "remain[] in public ownership." Id at 779 n.72. NORA 
subsequently has taken a somewhat more aggressive view of its power to transfer 
expropriated individual blighted properties, emboldened perhaps by its success at trial in New 
Orleans Redevelopment Authority v. Johnson, which susta ined NORA's use of the power to 
transfer such property to Habitat for Humanity, a private entity. See infra notes 128-129 and 
accompanying text. 
42. UNOP, supra note 21, § 5.4.4.3. To date, ORM has been its principal partner, and 
this charge has channeled virtually all of NORA's activities. NORA's acquisitions and 
dispositions are designed to support ORM's commitment to provide $1. l billion in 
infrastructure and related projects to revitalize neighborhoods in seventeen target recovery 
districts. See Press Release, City of N e w  Orleans Mayor's Office of Commc'ns, City 
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domain to unsnarl otherwise insuperable title problems that discourage 
investment in neighborhoods and areas that the marketplace has 
largely shunned.43 The fourth appears in UNOP's charge to NORA to 
"design the property transfer mechanisms necessary to implement the 
neighborhood cluster program."44 The last task is NORA's employment 
of eminent domain to resubdivide lots and blocks, when appropriate, to 
respond to the shifting footprint of the city's population, infrastructure 
capacity and location, and land uses.45 
2. NORA Private Sector Transfers of Expropriated Property 
NORA cannot discharge these functions if it is unable to transfer 
expropriated properties to private entities. Without the funds it 
Announces First 17 Target Recovery Zones (Mar. 29, 2007), http://w ww.cityofuo.com/ 
portal.aspx?portal= 1&load=-/PortalModules/ViewPressRelease.ascx&itemid=3 813; 
Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, supra note 37. NORA's 2008 work program calls 
for the expropriation of approximately l 000 blighted properties strategically located in 
relation to anticipated ORM infrastructure improvements or projects or to redevelopment 
properties acquired by not-for-profit private redevelopers. NORA also anticipates 
transferring to the private sector another 5000 Road Home properties through 20 l 0 as well as 
1500 tax-adjudicated properties transferred to it by other city agencies. Telephone Interview 
with John J. Marshall, supra note 37. 
43. The magnitude of this effort is detailed by Ariella Cohen, Hurdles to Heirship: 
Word of Mouth Inheritance Backs Some Siblings out of Family Homes (Aug. 4, 2008), 
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/Media/ AppleseedintheNews/tabid/11 O/EntryID/203/Defau 
lt.aspx. Frank Alexander observes that these title problems beset properties coming to 
NORA from various sources, including tax adjudication and code enforcement. See 
Alexander, supra note 27, at 733, 739-43. He notes title problems as well with so-called "heir 
property," which in many New Orleans inner city areas passes within the same family from 
generation to generation without probate or other process establishing the successor owners' 
identity and title. Id at 732. He also worries that doubts concerning the city's condemnation 
powers raised by the state's 2006 constitutional amendments must be resolved in the city's 
favor before its power to transfer expropriated property to private parties is secured. Id at 
7 43. A final title issue is posed by obsolete paper subdivisions recorded decades ago that 
abound throughout the city's high risk areas. Telephone Interview with Stephen Villavaso, 
UNOP Co-Author, in New Orleans, La. (June 20, 2008). 
44. One of the alternatives-parcel swaps--considered by the city under the fourth 
application was premised on two considerations: NORA's legal authority to become a 
depository of or to acquire a substantial inventory of properties and the expectation that the 
post-Katrina population and housing needs of higher risk, lower elevation areas would 
decrease while those of lower risk, higher elevation areas would stabilize or increase. Under 
the alternative, parcels in the former locations would be acquired principally by purchase 
although eminent domain might be used to acquire strategic "hold-out" parcels or those beset 
by title difficulties. The parcels' former owners who chose to return to or remain in the city 
would then be provided with parcels in NORA's inventory that meet the city's locational 
criteria for "clustering" and "densification." The program would seek to have the transferee, 
lower risk parcel positioned as close as possible to the transferor parcel to minimize or avoid 
social disruption within impacted neighborhoods. Interview with Ed Blakely, Director, 
Mayor's Office of Recovery Management, in New Orleans, La. (June 5, 2007). 
45. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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receives from the properties' sale, it lacks the resources to reenter the 
market to purchase or expropriate additional properties. Requiring 
NORA to retain these parcels or transfer them only to other 
governmental agencies, moreover, also defeats the neighborhood 
revitalization goals it shares with ORM. Relatively few of these 
properties are needed for governmental facilities. The cost of 
maintaining them would overwhelm NORA's meager annual 
acquisition and maintenance budget. Most important, rejuvenation of 
the neighborhoods demands that these properties return to private 
ownership, initiative, and use. Renovation, new construction, 
calculation of investment risk and return, and most important, vitality 
and excitement for the restored neighborhood: these are private sector 
functions for which NORA may perhaps be the midwife, but not the 
parent.46 
At this writing, the legal turbulence following adoption of the 
Louisiana constitutional amendments in late 2006 has contributed to 
New Orleans' failure to pursue either of the last two charges, to 
designate a single Community Improvement Project, or to establish a 
land bank of the scope anticipated by the city's mayor.47 Indeed, Part 
N discloses that the state's 2006 amendments can plausibly be 
interpreted to preclude the city's transfer of any expropriated parcel­
blighted or otherwise-to the private sector. 
III. KELO, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND THE ANTI-KELO FORMAT 
Conclusions regarding the principal patterns reflected in the 
states' post-Keio responses must remain tentative at this writing. None 
of them has been authoritatively construed by a state supreme court. 
Oversimplification threatens facile summary, moreover. To date, at 
least forty-two states have adopted measures, a number of which 
undertake complex revisions of constitutional property/takings clauses 
or of some combination of eminent domain, urban development, and 
civil procedure statutes. 
It is clear, however, that most states tempered their initial distress 
with Keio as the learning process matured.48 Very few adopted what 
46. Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, supra note 37. 
4 7. Telephone Interview with Ed Blakely, supra note 44. 
48. Professor Sornin's evaluation of the nation's post-Keio measures concludes with 
his statement that "much of the proposed legislation is likely to have little effect and may 
simply represent 'position-taking' intended to mollify public opinion." Somin, supra note 7, 
at 190. In a subsequent study, he specified that of thirty-six measures analyzed, "twenty-two 
. . .  are largely symbolic in nature, providing little or no protection for property owners," and 
"[ s ]everal of the remainder were enacted by states that had little or no history of condemning 
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this Article dubs anti-eminent domain "nuclear" options. A somewhat 
larger group imposed substantive constraints on eminent domain's use 
for urban revitalization, principally by defining "blight" more 
restrictively. The largest group, however, favored an array of 
significant but less dramatic procedural and compensatory 
modifications.49 Part 11 features the first two groups because 
Louisiana's 2006 amendments will likely be construed to place the 
state somewhere between them. 
A. Some Preliminary Drafting Conundrums: "Economic 
Development" and Pn·vate Transfers 
"Economic development" · and government's transfer of 
expropriated property to private entities are the betes noires of anti­
Kelo sentiment. How might a post-Keio measure be drafted to address 
each element? 
There is no simple answer. Banning both outright as invalid 
public uses is not an option because each is firmly and favorably 
embedded in state constitutions, legislation, and practice. 
Private transfers and the more imposing delegation of the eminent 
domain power to private entities have been commonplace since the 
nineteenth century.50 Unsurprisingly, therefore, post-Keio measures 
restricting these transfers are replete with exemptions, qualifications, 
and escape clauses. Private entities to whom eminent domain 
property for economic development." Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the 
Political Response to Keio, 93 MrNN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), avaJlable 
athttp://ssrn.com/abstract_id=976298 (last visited Nov. 22, 2008). 
49. These changes include more liberal attorneys', mediators', and appraisers' fees 
and relocation payments to condernnees; elevated standards of just compensation with 
increases required for acquisition of residences and of property destined for a more lucrative 
use; heightened standards for accountability and documentation/justification of such agency 
actions as blight and redevelopment parcel and area boundary detenninations; a related 
increase in judicial scrutiny and burden of proof required to justify these agency actions; 
imposition of supermajority voting requirements by elected officials for approval of agency 
actions; establishment of eminent domain "ombudsmen" to protect condemnee interests; 
avoidance of "planning blight" by requiring commencement of redevelopment projects within 
tightened deadlines; heightened burden on agencies to show "necessity" of parcel acquisition, 
especially for unblighted parcels and recourse to eminent domain rather than acquisition by 
voluntary transfer; and the vesting of various rights of first refusal in condernnees to preclude 
expropriated property's transfer within stated time periods to other private parties or the 
property's utilization for a purpose other than that supporting the agency's eminent domain 
petition. 
50. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and 
Economically Motivated Conde111J11Jtion, 1 7  REv. LITIG. 145, 152-53 ( 1 998); Harry N. 
Scheiber, Property Law, Expropdation, aJJd Resource Allocation by the Government: The 
Umted States 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237 ( 1973). 
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authority has been delegated51 or who function as common carriers or 
furnish public utilities52 may use or own expropriated private property. 
State legislatures may authorize these transfers by general law53 or on a 
case-by-case basis.54 Favored state agencies receive exemptions.55 
Likewise exempted are grandfathered projects56 or those undertaken in 
areas defined by political jurisdiction or other classification.51 
Cabining "economic development" has proven to be a fool's 
errand. However problematic the phrase's treatment by the Kelo 
majority, its presence as one of eminent domain's goals is confirmed 
by its traditional use to acquire land for roads, airports, seaports, public 
utilities, common carriers, and other vehicles of commerce. The 
power supports the many public-private partnerships that states now 
embrace for economic development through their spending, taxing and 
police powers in order to offset the loss of formerly generous federal 
funding for such vital state needs as transportation and highway 
construction.58 A categorical ban on economic development, 
moreover, would clash both with other constitutional or statutory 
provisions encouraging its pursuit and with the states'  aggressive use 
of these powers to attract industry and other sources of economic 
growth.59 
To be truly effective, moreover, post-Ke/o measures must 
disallow eminent domain-based economic development rather than 
merely discount it as a factor that independently satisfies the public use 
5 1 .  IND. Com: ANN. § 32-24-4- 1 (West Supp. 2008 ); MONT. CODI' ANN. § 7-30-
1 02(44) (2007 ). 
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 2- 1 - 1 (4)(8)  (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5 ( 1 )(a)(3). 
53. FLA. CONST. art. x. § 6(c). 
54. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55 .240( 1) (2006). 
5 5 .  TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.<l0 l (c)( 2 )  (Vernon 2008) (port authorities and 
navigation and reclamation districts) .  
56. 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 2 1 4, § 22(b),  included in Historical and Statutory Notes to 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 1 1 7.025 (West Supp. 2008 ) (grandfathering all eminent domain actions 
commenced in tax increment financing districts on or prior to February I ,  2008 ). 
57. 2007 Va. Acts chs. 882, 90 1 ,  926, i11cludcd 1/1 History and Statutory Notes to VA. 
CODE ANN. � 2 5 . 1 - 1 08(3 ) (Supp. 2008) (providing in identical third and fourth enactments 
exemptions for redevelopment and housing authorities to acquire property pursuant to plans 
approved prior to January 1 . 2007): sc� also 26 PA. CONS. ST:\T. § 203( b )( 3 )-( 4) ( Supp. 2008) 
(allowing expropriation of areas deemed blighted prior to May 4. 2006. in various classes or 
categories of cities). 
58.  See. e.g.. DF.LOITTE RESEARCH, CLOSING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE GAP: THE 
ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2007). http://W\\ow.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/ 
us_ps_pPPUS_final( I ).pdf; D. Joseph Darr. Cum.·nt Tn·nds in Public-Pn.r ntc Partnersh ip 
Laws, 28 CONSTR. LAW. 53 (2008). 
59. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 1  (expropriation of land for private industrial use to 
achieve "economic impact"); TENN. CODE ANN. ;i 29- 1 7- 1 02(2 J(E)  (Supp. 2008) (expropri­
ation of land for industrial parks for econom i c  development goals). 
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requirement. The UNOP example demonstrates why: namely, 
redevelopment-based eminent domain serves an array of pwposes, 
only one of which is economic development Noneconomic develop­
ment purposes that may be attended by economic consequences 
cannot be equated with economic development purposes if the latter 
terms are to have intelligible boundaries .  But economic consequences 
are permissible under post-Keio measures if the purpose of the 
measure giving rise to them is not itself solely or primarily economic 
development. 
The point is confirmed by a few queries. Is San Francisco's 
commitment to historic preservation motivated exclusively or even 
principally by economic development? What about New York City's 
successful program to eliminate sex businesses and vice from its Times 
Square Broadway Theater district? Does New Orleans err in a UNOP 
Plan that equates only one of its ten planning sectors with "economic 
development"? Is NORA's effort to reduce crime in blighted neighbor­
hoods through targeted acquisition of troubled properties an exercise in 
economic development? 
Eminent domain has been used in aid of each of the foregoing 
activities and, of course, an open-ended class of others. Each 
undoubtedly engages economic issues at one level or another and, if 
successfully undertaken, will indeed hike the host city's tax receipts. 
But labeling these activities as "economic development" puts the cart 
before the horse. Their economic benefits are a significant but 
secondary consequence of the fulfillment of other human and social 
needs such as confirmation of community identity, the creation of a 
healthy and safe environment, or enjoyment of the fun and fantasy in 
the world's most fabled entertainment district.60 
60. For an extended assessment of the many legally recognized ways of experiencing 
and responding to urban space beyond its status as an economic good, see generally JOHN J. 
COSTONIS, lCONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ( 1 989). 
Urban ecologist Walter Firey speaks to this point in rejecting the rigid perspective of those 
who "have made of spatial adaptation a strictly economic phenomenon. They have begun by 
regarding all social systems as purely economic units. They have then postulated that the 
only socially relevant quality of space is its costfulness as an economic good." WALTER 
FTREY, LAND USE fN CENTRAL BOSTON 19 ( 1 947). In his evaluation of New London's 
development plan, Professor Richard Brooks counters such reductionism by stressing that the 
plan's focus on the city's maritime character and history highlights a 
crucial element in New London's identity, based upon its history, its surroundings, 
and this continuous effort to perpetuate that heritage. Every city has its identity 
and those who live, work, and visit that city can share in that identity. Without 
exaggeration, one might say that the development plan expressed New London's 
collective memory and identity as a marine city continuing to seek sustainability in 
a changing economy. The sustainability as a maritime city means the presence of 
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Purpose and consequence have become confused in the post­
Keio dialogue. Keio started the ball rolling by trivializing eminent 
domain-based urban redevelopment as merely government's entitle­
ment to favor the higher private taxpayer. Unlinking eminent domain 
from substantive redevelopment goals and converting it into an adjunct 
of the taxing power laid the conceptual basis for repositioning urban 
redevelopment exclusively as a subcategory of economic development. 
Anti-Keio proponents seized on Justice O'Connor's catchy "Motel 6 
for Ritz-Carlton" phrasemaking to disregard redevelopment goals that 
not only can't be equated with economic development, but that render 
private sector investment feasible by securing such other, more 
fundamental values as neighborhood safety or civic identity and pride. 
The Court could and should have avoided this scenario. New 
London's pervasive urban problems-many similar to those besetting 
New Orleans pre- and post-Katrina-afforded the Court ample 
opportunity to confirm that eminent domain-based urban development 
is an independent activity designed to serve a variety of land use goals, 
many of which may indeed generate beneficial economic 
consequences. 61 
By themselves, therefore, restrictions on "economic develop­
ment" do not advance the anti-Keio agenda. On the contrary, measures 
most hostile to Keio ignore economic development altogether.62 
Restrictions on the latter in other measures, it will be shown, do not 
restrain eminent domain on the basis of economic development's 
largely unspecified content but by linking the concept to other 
an economy that supports the way of life of its residents and protects the marine 
environment. 
Richard 0. Brooks, Keio and the "Whaling City':· The Failure of the Supreme Court's 
Opportunity to Articulate a Public Purpose of Sustainability, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS, supra note 29, at 5, 8. 
6 1 .  Richard Brooks observes: 
The [New London Redevelopment] Plan was more than an economic 
development plan. . . . The plan also proposed the environmental c leanup of more 
than a century of marine-industrial activities as well as the protection and 
restoration of important wetlands, improvements of the sewer system, and control 
of odor pollution from the waste-water treatment facility in the area. In short, the 
ninety-acre plan was, to all intents and purposes, a classic redevelopment plan 
seeking to take advantage of some on-going public projects, but adding and 
coordinating them with some new public and private initiatives. . . . [T]he 
development plan represented a bold new effort to continue New London's 
maritime heritage with access to the sea, water-related recreation, and a historical 
reminder of what New London was all about. 
Brooks, supra note 60, at 7-8. 
62. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
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elements, principal among which are closed-ended public use 
inventories, private transfers, and restrictions on eminent domain­
based urban redevelopment.63 The case for economic development's 
efficacy as a self-contained restraint collapses altogether when even a 
staunch anti-Keio academician complains that twenty-two post-Keio 
measures utilizing this criterion provide "little or no real protection for 
property owners."64 
B. TheAnti-Kelo Format 
Post-Keio measures most hostile to eminent domain-based 
redevelopment display some combination of four elements in addition 
to economic development restrictions. Those less hosti le e ither avoid 
these elements or substantially qualify their scope. The elements 
include a closed-ended inventory of public uses, outright or invasive 
bans on eminent domain's use for urban redevelopment, similar bans 
on private transfers, and enactment of the measure in constitutional 
form rather than-or in addition to--statutory form. 
C Open- versus Closed-Ended Public Use Inventories 
One way of containing the eminent domain power is to restrict its 
functions strictly to activities expressly deemed to be "public uses." 
The federal and, until Keio, state constitutions or eminent domain 
statutes rejected this closed-ended approach, leaving it to the judiciary 
to assess the phrase 's scope in relation to the legislature 's conception of 
imperative social and economic needs. But this reactive posture is 
opposed by those who fear that public officials may prove 
disrespectful of private property rights, or be predisposed to corrupt or 
otherwise pernicious relationships with the redevelopment system's 
private actors.65 For them, nothing short of "nuclear bans" on private 
63. Any eminent domain-based activity that substantially serves a public use other 
than economic development is unscathed by provisions discounting consideration of the latter 
in the public use calculation. But the activity cannot proceed or will otherwise be hobbled if 
that use is not included in an inventory in a closed-ended state, see infra notes 65-73 and 
accompanying text; engages a category of property not included within a narrowly drawn 
blight definition, see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text; or requires the participation of 
a private recipient or user in states that ban or restrict transfers for private use or ownership, 
see infra notes 95-1 0 2  and accompanying text. 
64. See Somin, supra note 7, at 184. 
65.  See CASTLE COAL., supm note 11, at 23 3-41. 
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transfers and on eminent domain 's redevelopment uses66 are truly 
satisfactory. 
The closed-ended drafting option affords them a vehicle that 
features a litany of approved publi c  uses, and rules out any eminent 
domain use not expressly approved in the inventory. Recurrent entries 
include publicly owned facilities and buildings; transportation facilities 
including highways, ports, navigation improvements, airports, and 
railroads; public and private utilities and common carriers; drainage 
and flood control networks and facilities; private uses incidental to the 
expropriated property's dominant public use; blight remediation and 
area redevelopment; and parks, convention centers, and recreational 
centers open to the public. Expressly disapproved as public uses are 
economic development and the transfer or use of expropriated property 
for the private benefit of private entities. 67 
Open-ended inventories do not enumerate specific public use 
categories,68 although they may supplement the general concept with 
examples of activities deemed to fall within it. The generic "public 
use" concept remains vital, however, as a residual source of authority 
for the power's exercise. 
The closed-ended option purchases apparent certainty and 
containment at a dubious cost. Government's purposes are not static, 
of course, as the last century's evolution of the police and eminent 
domain powers in land use law confirms. 69 
What lies ahead for American cities, I believe, is almost certain to 
demand enlarged governmental engagement in urban systems 
66. See Jnfra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (ban on eminent domain-based 
development); infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (ban on private transfers). 
67. The format is exemplified by VA. CODE ANN. § 1 -2 1 9. l (A) (2008) in its statement 
that "[t]he term 'public uses' . . .  is hereby defined as to embrace only the acquisition of 
property where [the exerCise of eminent domain supports the purposes inventoried]" 
(emphasis added). For other closed-ended provisions, see, for example, KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26-501 (b) (200 I ); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § l 62-K:2(IX-a) (Supp. 2008). 
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 ,  § 816(4) (Supp. 2007) ("Nothing in this section . . .  
prohibit[s] a . . .  governing body from exercising the power of eminent domain for purposes 
not otherwise prohibited by subsection l ."); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (eliminating economic 
development as a public use and providing that "[p ]rivate property otherwise may be taken 
for reasons of public use as that term is understood on the effective date of the amendment to 
this constitution that added this paragraph"). 
69. The Supreme Court approved zoning as a police power exercise, for example, as a 
response to land use needs created by the nation's increasing urbanization. See Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-97 ( 1 926). The Court subsequently approved 
eminent domain-based slum clearance in response to the decline of many American cities in 
the early- and mid-twentieth-century period. See Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 
(1954). 
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management, including the use of eminent domain-based 
redevelopment initiatives. 10 
But we need not ponder mega-trends to conclude that the closed­
ended option can produce pernicious consequences. The risk of these 
consequences is written all over the New Orleans case study. 
Inexplicably, Louisiana, unlike Ohio11 and other states,72 does not 
include eminent domain's deployment to combat a natural disaster or 
public peril in its public purpose inventory. Compounding this failure 
of public policy, Louisiana's closed-ended provision is a constitutional 
measure, forcing its judiciary, legislature and local governments to 
ransack its impoverished text in search of language-any language­
that might serve as a predicate for the power's use. 73 
D Banning or Restricting Eminent Domain s Use for Urban 
Redevelopment 
Keio did not call into question a municipality's power to employ 
eminent domain for substantive planning purposes. Even Justice 
O'Connor approved its use for blight removal, objecting instead to the 
majority's support of private transfers for "economic development."74 
Her distinction between these two uses of the power, it bears emphasis, 
is echoed in the decisions of the many state courts that likewise oppose 
the power's use for economic development, but not for blight 
mitigation or area redevelopment.15 
70. See infra note 1 50 and accompanying text. 
7 1 .  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1 728.01 (C)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) defines an 
"impacted city" as one that has been "declared a major disaster area, or part of a major 
disaster area, pursuant to the [federal] 'Disaster Relief Act of 1 970,' . . . and has been 
extensively damaged or destroyed by a major disaster." Subsection (I) of this provision 
defines a "major disaster" as "any tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal 
wave, earthquake, fire, or other catastrophe." Id § 1 728.01 (I). In their pathbreaking course 
book, Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, Daniel Farber and Jirn Chen observe that 
a "disaster law" book is required because it "is hard to think of anything equally important 
that has received such little sustained attention from lawyers and law professors." FARBER & 
CHEN, supra note 1 5, at xix. 
72. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1- l ( l ){A)(iii) (Supp. 2008). 
73. Significantly, NORA's founding statute does anticipate the possibility of eminent 
domain's use in redevelopment areas "as a result of an act of God, fire, bombing, riot, or other 
catastrophe" and permits the city's governing body to waive conditions relating to approvals 
of community improvement projects. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.57(G) (Supp. 
2008). Because this statutory provision predates the Louisiana constitutional amendments, 
however, it is doubtful that it survives the amendments' closed-ended inventory. 
74. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
75. The cases are collected in llya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad 
for the Poor?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1931 ,  1936-37 n.30 (2007). 
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But the anti-Keio format is more radical because its supporters 
fear that economic development goals may be disguised in blight 
remediation garb. 76 The format not only bans the former as an 
independent public use, but seeks to ban or severely shrink the power's 
blight remediation function when used to acquire individual parcels 
and, even more determinedly, when used to assemble multiple 
properties in a project area. This effort often overlaps with provisions 
restricting private transfers, which are addressed independently in the 
following section. 
1 .  The Nuclear Option: Banning Blight Takings 
The post-Keio measures adopted by Florida and New Mexico 
illustrate the nuclear option because they flatly ban expropriation of 
private property for blight remediation or slum clearance.77 Florida 
cancels the power's use "for the purpose of abating or eliminating a 
public nuisance,"78 or "for the purpose of preventing or eliminating 
slum or blight conditions,"79 and deems both activities a violation of 
the state constitution's "public purpose" requirement.80 New Mexico 
follows suit by denying local governments authority to employ 
eminent domain to address metropolitan redevelopment concems.81 
2. The Nonnuclear Options: Shrinking the Blight Concept 
Shrinking the blight concept also impedes eminent domain's use, 
particularly if the option is further linked to private transfer restrictions. 
Post-Keio measures manifest various degrees of shrinkage running 
from blight definitions that effectively reduce blight to its origins in 
public nuisance law to others of marginally lesser severity to a final 
group that leave largely intact the broader blight and slum clearance 
parameters developed in the mid-twentieth century.82 
76. See CASTLE COAL., supra note 1 1 , at 3-4; Somin, supra. note 7, at 265-67. 
77. The Florida and New Mexico provisions merit comparison with South Dakota's 
somewhat less "nuclear" ban, which, unlike the former provisions, permits expropriation of 
blighted property if the property remains in public ownership. See 2006 S.D. H.B. I 080 
(signed into law Feb. 27, 2006). As noted in notes 98-102 and accompanying text, infra, a 
categorical ban on transfer precludes use of public-private partnerships as a vehicle for urban 
redevelopment. 
78. FLA. STAT ANN. §  73.014( 1 )  (West Supp. 2008). 
79. Id § 73.014(2). 
80. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). 
8 1 .  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-3(C) (Supp. 2008). Section 3- 1 8 - 1  O(B)(3) provides an 
exemption for vacating obsolete plats. 
82. For a detailed state-by-state analysis of post-Keio measures running the gamut 
described in the text, see Sornin, supra note 48, at 3 1-40. 
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Among the nuisance-type standards are those found in the New 
Hampshire,83 Virginia,84 and Oregon statutes.Rs Somewhat less 
restrictive but still both severe and precise in their detailed standards 
are measures that enumerate multiple considerations that in one or 
more combinations warrant a blight determination. 86 
Two additional restrictions may be imposed. The first, which 
allows government to expropriate but not to transfer blighted property, 
undermines eminent domain's use in a public-private partnership mode 
by eliminating the private sector as a recipient of expropriated 
property.87 The second, which attacks the power's use to assemble and 
consolidate multiple strategic parcels, requires that each condemned 
parcel must be blighted.88 This provision conflicts with statutes 
permitting the inclusion of nonblighted properties in area-wide project 
designations89 and with Bennan's holding that the acquisition of these 
properties does not violate the Fifth Amendment's public use 
requirement. 
From the opposite end of the spectrum are provisions that 
continue to define the urban redevelopment enterprise expansively by 
incorporating blight prevention goals such as "sound growth" and 
avoidance of "social and economic liability,"90 or by approving 
83. See N.H. REv. STAT ANN. § 1 62-K:2 IX-a(3) (Supp. 2008) (authorizing 
condemnation of "structures beyond repair, public nuisances, structures unfit for human 
habitation or use, and abandoned property when such structures or property constitute a 
menace to health and safety"). 
84. VA. CODE ANN . §  1 -2 1 9. l(B) (2008) (defining blighted property as property "that 
endangers the public health or safety . . .  and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual . . .  
structure . . .  that is beyond repair or unfit for human occupancy or use"). 
85. OR. REv. STAT. § 35.015 (2)(a) (2007) (allowing that property may be expropriated 
that "constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community by reason of 
contamination, dilapidated structures, improper or insufficient water or sanitary facilities, or 
any combination of these factors"). 
86. See, e.g, GA. CODE ANN. § 22- 1- 1  ( 1  )(A)-(B) (Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 2 13 .23(3)(8)(a)-(h) (West Supp. 2008). 
87. The obstacles created by the no-transfer language are addressed jnfra note 128 
and accompanying text. The expropriation but nontransfer option appears in the many post­
Ke/o measures that preclude expropriation "for the purpose" of transferring its ownership or 
use to another private party, assuming that courts construe this language to address the result 
rather than the pwpose of the exercise. On the result/purpose distinction, see 1nfra note 1 27 
and accompanying text. Illustrative of these measures is N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-1 5-0 1 (2) 
(Supp. 2007), which bans expropriation "for the use of, or ownership by, any private 
individual or entity, unless that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or 
utility business." 
1 ( 1 ) . 
88. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(a)( l )  (LexisNexis 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 22- 1-
89. 
90. 
See statutes cited supra note 6. 
The statutes are collected in Somin, supra note 75, at 1933 nn.7- 1 1 .  
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economic development if the latter i s  one of the project's "secondary 
impacts."91 These measures may treat blight remediation as a category 
distinct from economic development,92 or exempt urban-renewal-based 
uses of the eminent domain power from private transfer bans,93 or both. 
Area-wide as well as parcel-by-parcel blight determinations may be 
made, moreover, subject to conditions supporting the reasonableness 
of including nonblighted property in the eventual project assemblage.94 
E Restncting Pn'vate Transfers 
The difficulty of distinguishing economic development from 
other redevelopment purposes undoubtedly accounts for measures that 
opt to bar or restrict the transfer o f  expropriated property to other 
private entities. This blunt approach95 sidesteps the definitional 
problem in favor of the simpler task of exempting from its reach 
private transfers undertaken by public utilities96 or common carriers.97 
A number of these measures also exempt blight remediation but 
mitigate the definitional challenge by shrinking blight's scope under 
one of the alternatives described in the previous Part. This 
indiscriminate approach, like the latter, includes both nuclear and 
nonnuclear options. 
1 .  Nuclear Option: A (Close to) Flat Ban on Private Transfers 
A categorical ban on private transfers without more obliterates 
eminent domain's use for urban renewal as a public/private 
undertaking by eliminating the private partner without whom urban 
redevelopment often cannot practicably proceed. Correlative 
constraints on economic development or blight removal are 
unnecessary although they often appear in measures alongside the 
nuclear option. 
9 1 .  Texas'  measure, for example, permits eminent domain for economic development 
provided that the latter "is a secondary purpose resulting from . . .  municipal urban renewal 
activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas." 
TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. §  2206.00 1(b)(3) (Vernon 2008). 
92. See, e.g, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 532.271  (2) {West Supp. 2008); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. 
§ 203 .3(XIV)(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2008). 
93. SeeTEX. Gov'T CODEANN. § 2206.00l(b)(3). 
94. See statutes cited supra note 6. 
95. Indiscriminate restrictions on private transfers substantially overshoot Justice 
O'Connor's d issenting viewpoint, which fmds them unobjectionable if the eminent domain­
based measure remedies an affirmative harm. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
96. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5(l )(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
97. See GA. CooEANN. § 2-1 -1(1 ) (Supp. 2008). 
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Earlier discussion clarifies that because none of the post-Kele 
measures is unqualified, none absolutely bans private transfers. But 
the amendments to the Florida,98 New Hampshire,99 and North Dakota 
constitutions100 and to South Dakota's redevelopment statute 1 0 1  come 
close. Florida's provision is the most restrictive of the four because, as 
supplemented by statute, wi it bans both the expropriation and private 
transfer of redevelopment parcels, while the latter three states ban the 
parcel's private transfer, but not its expropriation. 
2. Nonnuclear Options 
A variety of less categorical options have also been devised. One 
bars expropriation or private transfers if the current use of the target 
property falls within a proscribed category. 103 Another prevents local 
governments from executing private transfers for a specified nwnber 
of years following the property's expropriation. South Dakota, for 
example, grants the former owner-condemnee a right of first refusal 
prior to the property's sale to other private entities within seven years 
of its taking. Should the former owner decline, the property must be 
sold on a competitive, open-bid basis. 1 04 
The option linking a time delay to the former owner's right of 
first refusal could prove as potent in practice as the nuclear option. 
Public-private partnerships in the urban redevelopment setting require 
98. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c) provides that "[p]rivate property taken by eminent 
domain . . .  after January 2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity 
except as provided by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each 
house of the Legislature." 
99. N.H. CONST. art. 12-a provides that "[n)o part of a person's property shall be 
taken by eminent domain and transferred, directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking 
is for the purpose of private development or other private use of the property." 
I 00. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 6  provides that "[p )rivate property shall not be taken for the 
use of, or ownership by, any private individual or entity, unless that property is necessary for 
conducting a common carrier or utility business." 
1 0 1 .  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22. l (Supp. 2008) forbids counties, municipalities 
and redevelopment commissions from expropriating private property "[f]or transfer to any 
private person, nongovernmental entity, or other public-private business entity." 
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. §  73.014(1)-(2) (West 2008). 
1 03. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1 2- 1 773(a) (Supp. 2005) (conservation area); LA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 21(D) (homestead). 
104. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22.2. A closely related but less potent option is 
conferring a right of first refusal on former owners if the property is not devoted to the use 
for which it was originally expropriated. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1 l -47-1 70(c) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-322 (2007). 
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an integrated acquisition-disposition process and a flexible public­
private partner negotiation process, both of which the option denies.105 
E Constitutional versus Statutory or Combined Constitutional/ 
Statutory Options 
At first blush, many observers would likely agree with the claim 
that incorporating post-Keio changes in a constitutional amendment is 
"unambiguously the most effective way"106 to address objections to the 
Keio holding. The claim is not without its appeal. As a foundational 
right, property merits protection in a foundational document. The 
change 's durability, moreover, is better assured in a constitution, which 
is less easily amended than a statute. These considerations apparently 
proved persuasive to the seven states that, at this writing, have chosen 
this route. 101 
But constitutionalizing post-Keio measures is not without its risks 
for Keio opponents . Abstract constitutional texts in general and 
property clauses in particular afford courts ample interpretative 
leeway: the terms "health and safety," "economic development," and 
transfers "for" such goals as "private use" or "private development" 
are anything but self-defining. Courts attuned to a community's 
redevelopment needs will be disposed to construe them to favor rather 
than undermine eminent domain's use when, as in the New Orleans 
case study, a contrary interpretation will effectively shut down eminent 
domain-based redevelopment.108 
Outcomes unhelpful to the anti-Keio format's intent can also be 
anticipated because constitutional property clauses cut a much broader 
swath than state eminent domain or urban redevelopment statutes-the 
two principal targets of nonconstitutional post-Keio measures. 
Redefining "public use," for example, implicates not only govern­
ment's management of urban redevelopment, but its exercise of the 
spending, taxing, and police powers. 109 Courts may choose to construe 
1 05. This issue is revisited in subsequent discussion of LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(H) . See 
infra notes 1 30- 1 32 and accompanying text. 
I 06. CASTLE COAL., supra note 1 1 , at 44. 
107. The seven states are New Hampshire, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Louisiana, 
North Dakota, and South Carolina. Nevada has underway an initiative-Assembly Joint 
Resolution 3-that, if approved in 2009 by the state legislature and in 20 1 0  by the state's 
voters, will assume constitutional form as well. See id 
1 08. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authodty v. Johnson). 
109. In Louisiana, the phrase "public purpose," which is defined in LA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4(B)(3) to exclude economic development, also appears in six other constitutional 
provisions, each of which authorizes activities or governmental support for activities that 
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these reformulations very narrowly to avoid conflicts with settled 
understandings of these other powers. 
IY. LOUISIANA'S CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Louisiana's post-Keio response incorporates a tail-chasing maze 
of bans, qualifications, and exemptions. Tedious and tentative as its 
detailed analysis most certainly is, the exercise affords a real-world 
scenario against which to evaluate both the Keio controversy's most 
perplexing challenges as well as to portray the dead end to which 
libertarian anti-Keio critique leads for American cities with pressing 
eminent domain redevelopment needs. 
The exercise, moreover, is not an exercise in Louisiana exotica: 
many of the fundamental conflicts and ambiguities that it surfaces 
reappear in many of the forty-one other states' post-Keio measures. 
Tragic in itself, therefore, Katrina's decimation of New Orleans, an 
event that followed Keio and preceded Louisiana's post-Keio measure, 
serves as a laboratory in which the adequacy of the last two elements 
can be weighed against the public necessities created by the first. 
A. Open- or Closed-Ended Inventory 
Louisiana's provision is closed-ended. 1 1 0  When combined with its 
failure to address public disasters as a public purpose and the 
possibility that the provision may also be construed to prevent private 
transfers,1 1 1 its closed-ended feature could simply shut down any 
eminent domain-based New Orleans' recovery strategy, including 
NORA's five charges under UNOP. 1 12 
clearly enhance community economic welfare. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 7  (zoning and land 
use control), art. VI, § 23 (power of local governments to acquire property by any means, 
including eminent domain), art. VII, § I (taxing power), art. Vil, § 10 (appropriation power), 
art. VII, § 14(8)(3) (pledges of public funds, credit, or property), art. VII, § 1 4(C) 
(government's power to enter into "cooperative arrangements" to implement public/private 
partnerships). Louisiana has compounded the likelihood of conflict between article I, section 
4 and one or more of these other constitutional provisions by failing to supplement its 
constitutional measure with clarifying statutory amendments to its eminent domain or 
redevelopment codes. 
1 1 0. Article I, section 4(B)(2) of the Louisiana Constitution approves as "public 
purposes" a general public right to a definite use of the property; continuous public 
ownership of property used for public buildings, land and maritime transportation systems, 
drainage, flood control and navigational protection, various recreational and cultural facilities, 
public utilities, and public ports and airports; and expropriation to remove threats to public 
health or safety. Section 4(BX3) negates consideration of both economic development and 
enhancement of tax revenue as public purposes. 
1 1 1 . See infra note I 27 and accompanying text. 
1 12 .  See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text. 
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B. Economic Development· An Insufficient Public Pmpose 
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The Louisiana measure confirms the inefficacy of post-Keio 
economic development clauses. It clearly distinguishes economic 
development from urban redevelopment. The latter, presented as 
authority to remove "threat[s] to public health or safety,"113 is included 
in an inventory of activities expressly approved as "public purposes." 
Economic development surfaces in an independent clause disquali­
fying it for consideration as a public purpose.114 
Both this syntax and the measure's legislative history1 15 insure 
that, by itself, the economic development clause will not bar NORA 
from utilizing its condemnation power in accordance with UNOP 
expectations.1 16 The nine UNOP elements earlier titled as serving 
goals other than economic development, 1 11 moreover, would not appear 
to violate the clause. Whether or not NORA's execution of its UNOP 
mandate survives the measure's other clauses, however, is more 
problematic. 
C. Urban Redevelopment· Banneq U0lcome4 or Restricted in 
Louisiana? 
The problems commence with the measure's sole provision 
addressing the authority of Louisiana local governments to engage in 
eminent domain-based redevelopment. Article 1 ,  section 4(B)(2)(c) 
qualifies as a "public purpose" the power's use for "removal of a threat 
to public health or safety caused by the existing use or disuse of the 
property." Does this language empower NORA to fulfill its UNOP­
defined role? 
The only certain response at this time is that the section does not 
impose either Florida's or New Mexico's nuclear ban on redevelop­
ment. But neither does the section welcome this outcome. The 
difficult question for the Louisiana courts will be the extent to which 
the section impedes their achievement. 
113. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(c). 
114. Section 4(B)(3), id, provides that "[n]either economic development, enhancement 
of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in determining 
whether the raking or damaging of property is for a public purpose." 
115.  See John J. Costonis, Eminent Domain Under the 2006 Louisiana Constitutional 
Amendments: The Legislature's Forward Pass to the Judiciary, 55 LA. B.J. 398, 403 nn.32-35 
(2008). 
116. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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Section 4(B)(2)( c) is open to an interpretation that activates two 
subordinate devices that may dictate this outcome. The first is 
sluinking the blight concept from its previously ample scope in 
Louisiana jurisprudence1 18 and statute law1 19 to one more attuned to a 
nineteenth-century regime of nuisance abatement or remediation. The 
second is limiting NORA's power to the acquisition of individual 
blighted parcels only, thereby barring NORA's assembly of multiple 
parcels, some o f  which may be unblighted, pursuant to its statutory 
power to designate community improvement projects. 
Limitation of the power's use under the first device will be 
proportioned to j udicial construction of the terms "health" and 
"safety." Anti-Keio proponents will advance the plausible c laim that 
the absence of the phrase "general welfare" warrants a narrow 
construction. This interpretation would bar eminent domain's use to 
clear titles on heir property or unvacated subdivisions. 120 It would also 
cast serious doubt on the power's use to support parcel swaps 
transferring ownership from properties in high risk locations to 
properties in favored, densification areas. 1 2 1  
But a more ample reading i s  not out of the question. It is 
difficult, after all, to imagine two more open-ended terms than 
"health" and "safety." The point is amplified in this instance because 
the legislature has not detailed their content in an accompanying 
amendatory statute andhas left in place generous statutory definitions 
of"blighted parcel" and "blighted area."122 
The amendment's legislative history, moreover, supports this 
outcome in two respects that I have detailed elsewhere. 123 Legislative 
debate clearly favored Justice O'Connor's support of urban 
redevelopment, while stoutly opposing Kelo's holding that increasing 
the community's tax base independent of any substantive p lanning 
1 1 8.  Rejecting a challenge in State v. Housing Authon·ty of New Orleans to the 
expropriation of blighted property for the construction of housing, the use of which would be 
transferred to qualified private tenants, the Louisiana Supreme Court accorded local 
governments great latitude in pursuing eminent domain-based redevelopment. 1 82 So. 725 
(La. 1 938). 
1 19. The definitions of "blight" and "blighted area" in NORA's founding statute 
clearly fit within the most generous of the three categories discussed supra notes 90-94 and 
accompanying text. 
120. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
1 2 1 .  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
1 22. See statutes cited sup.ra notes 30-34. For an example ofa state's two-step process, 
first, of adopting a broad constitutional provision, and second, of rendering the provision 
more precise in a companion amendatory statute, see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §  73.014(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2008). 
1 23. See generally Costonis, supra note 1 1 5 .  
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concern is a public use.124 The legislature also cautioned the measure's 
drafters to avoid adopting a provision that might undermine an 
eventual South Louisiana recovery program. 125 
Barring NORA from assembling strategic tracts of parcels, some 
of which may not meet section 4(B)(2)(c)'s narrow blight definition, or 
from designating community improvement projects would be a foolish 
policy when, three years after Katrina, square mile after square mile of 
New Orleans remain devastated, inert, unsafe, and shunned by private 
markets. Hence, the crucial question: does section 4(B)(2)(c) 's use of 
the language "the property" require this outcome? Should this 
language be read in a collective sense-the "property" encompassing a 
redevelopment area--or as referencing a single lot-Ms. Jones's 
"property"? 
A clear answer might have been available had Louisiana 
supplemented its constitutional measure with clarifying amendments 
to its eminent domain and redevelopment statutes. But the legislature 
chose not to do so, while leaving in place NORA's authority to 
condemn property throughout entire "community improvement 
projects."126 The survival of this authority in the face of the later­
adopted constitutional measure, while doubtful, remains an open 
question as well. 
D. Pn'vate Transfers: Nuclear and Nonnuclear Restrictions? 
Louisiana's measure could plausibly be construed to author one 
nuclear and two nonnuclear restrictions on private transfers. The 
former could be predicated on article 1 ,  section 4(B)(l), which 
opposes the taking of property "for predominant use by" or "for 
transfer of ownership to any private person or entity." If the term "for" 
refers to the result of the taking, the ban is nuclear. But if it refers to 
the taking's pwpose, private transfers are not barred so long as the 
project's private advantages are incidental to their public benefits. 121 
The first nonnuclear restriction would arise from interpreting 
section 4(B)(2)(c) to authorize condemnation, but not private 
disposition of distressed property. This interpretation meshes with 
124. Id at 403 nn.32-33 & 45. 
125. Id at 403 n.35. 
126. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.5 8(A) (Supp. 2008). 
127. The purpose-result distinction received the Louisiana Supreme Court's robust 
approval when it approved as a public use the link between expropriation and the lease of the 
fonnerly blighted property to private tenants in State v. Housing Authonty of New Orleans, 
182 So. 725, 745-46 (La. 1938). 
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what may be the nuclear ban construction of section 4(B)( l )  and the 
additional restrictions, discussed below, on transfers imposed by 
section 4(H)(l). 
But a contrary position has already been sustained in Louisiana at 
the trial level in a case foreshadowing what likely will be extensive 
litigation addressing the Louisiana measure's many uncertainties. At 
stake in New Orleans Redevelopment Authonty v. Johnson128 is the 
validity under section 4(B)(2)( c) of NORA's agreement to transfer an 
expropriated blighted property to Habitat for Humanity, a private 
entity. The court approved NORA's position that the "removal" of 
threats to health and safety under that section includes both its 
condemnation and its transfer to a private party. In an oral statement 
made from the bench, the trial judge reasoned that a contrary outcome 
could not have been the Louisiana Legislature's intent because the 
eminent domain-based component of New Orleans' recovery program 
would fail if the city were required to retain ownership of its 
expropriated property. 129 
A second nonnuclear restriction may plausibly be predicated on 
article 1 ,  sectio n  4(H)( 1 ), which, like the South Dakota provision 
examined earlier,130 subjects the sale or lease of expropriated property 
for a thirty-year period to a right of first refusal in the former owner. If 
the right is declined, the property may be sold or leased only by open 
competitive bid. 1 3 1  
But this constitutional text, too, admits to conflicting interpreta­
tions. Keio opponents will argue with no little force that section 
4(H)(l) overrides section 4(B)(2)(C) because property condemned 
under the latter section is not included in the exemptions e numerated 
in section 4(H)(l). Contrarily, the two provisions can be viewed as 
independent of one another, and, therefore, interpretation of the 
former's term "removal" to cover both condemnation and disposition is 
128. No. 2007-3 1 02 (La. Dist. Ct. Ori. May 9, 2008). 
129. Transcript of Record at 69-70, New Orleans Redevelopment Auth., No. 2007-
3 1 02. 
1 30. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22.2 (Supp 2008). This statute fixes a seven- rather 
than thirty-year right-of-refusal term. 
1 3 1 .  Article I, section 4(H)( l) of the Louisiana Constitution provides: 
Except for leases or operation agreements for port facilities, highways, qualified 
transportation facilities or airports, the state or its political subdivisions s hal l  not 
sell or lease property which has been expropriated and held for not more than thirty 
years without first offering the property to the original owner or his heir . . .  at the 
current fair market value, after which the property can only be transferred by 
competitive bid open to the general public. 
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not cut down by section 4(H)(l ) 's scythe. The latter argument 
prevailed at the trial level in New Orleans Redevelopment Authority v. 
Johnson and enjoys considerable support in the constitutional 
amendment's legislative history. 132 
E The Louisiana Measure as a Constitutional Amendment 
Louisiana cast its post-Kela response solely as a constitutional 
measure. Earlier discussion questioned the supposed efficacy that 
Kelo opponents ascribe to this route in light of the text's vague 
language and the uncertain relationships both among the measure's 
various clauses and between those c lauses and other constitutional or 
statutory provisions.133 
The Louisiana case study confirms these observations. The 
amendments' employment of one open-ended term after another to 
define the condemnation power's scope leaves unresolved, among 
other fundamental questions, whether municipalities now face a 
nuclear ban on private transfers, a qualified thirty-year obstacle to 
redevelopment-based transfers, and a regressive shrinking or, 
contrarily, an expansion of expropriation's scope. 
Unclear linkages among the amendments' various clauses 
compound these uncertainties. Does section 4(B)(2)(c)'s grant of 
power to "remove" threats to health and safety, for example, 
comprehend the condemnation-private disposition cycle essential to a 
public-private partnership? Or are private transfers ruled out by 
section 4(B)( l ) 's hostility to the "private" use or ownership of 
expropriated property and hampered by section 4(H)(l )'s further 
thirty-year restriction on private transfers? 
A third set of issues is posed by uncertainties in the relationship 
between the constitutional amendment and the continuing status of the 
public purpose concept in Louisiana's other constitutional clauses. As 
1 32 .  See Costonis, supra note 1 1 5,  at 403 nn.32-35. As this Article went to press, 
Louisiana voters, on November 4, 2008, declined to rescind section 4(H) in a referendum 
rejecting Act 936-SB No. 295 (Reg. Sess. 2008) setting forth the text of constitutional 
amendment number 6. Were the same question posed following the November referendum, 
opposition to this position can be anticipated on the grounds, first, that amendment number 6 
effectively concedes that section 4(H)( l )  does apply to section 4(B)(2)( c) and, second, that the 
voter's rejection of amendment number 6 conclusively establishes this outcome. This 
argument will fail, however, if Louisiana's appellate courts affirm the position of the trial 
judge in New Orleans Redevelopment Authonty v. Johnson that section 4(H)( l )  is not 
applicable to section 4(B)(2)(c). 
1 33. See supra notes 1 06-109 and accompanying text. 
426 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vo l.  83 :395 
already noted, 134 six other Louisiana constitutional provisions employ 
the term "public purpose"; each authorizes activities serving enhanced 
economic development goals; and article VI, section 2 1  expressly 
approves the expropriation and transfer to private parties o f  industrial 
property on the basis of its "economic impact." How, if at all, does 
article I, section 4's closed-ended redefinition of "public purpose" and 
the further exclusion of "economic development" impact these 
provisions? 135 
It is true that the difficulty of amending Louisiana's constitutional 
provision affords a reasonable guarantee of its durability. But the 
state's courts may find themselves inclined to interpret the measure 
cautiously, rather than robustly, precisely because of its longevity. 
When a measure is open to as many conflicting interpretations as 
Louisiana's measure, moreover, the outcome may only be durable 
uncertainty. Discussions with officials of ORM and NORA confirm 
that these uncertainties have caused them to forego eminent domain­
based redevelopment opportunities and have ignited an unresolved 
debate on how clarification of their authority might be obtained. 136 In 
the meantime New Orleans must simply muddle through, using its 
eminent domain power fitfully while, as Nicolai Ouroussoff observes, 
"three full years after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, 
much of the city remains a wasteland."131 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article assesses Keio and the first wave of post-Keio 
responses, including Louisiana's constitutional amendments, against 
the backdrop of a hurricane-battered city's recovery needs. Its point of 
l 34. See supra note I 09 and accompanying text. 
1 35.  Two examples from these clauses illustrate the interpretative challenge. First, 
does article VT, section 2 1  's "economic impact" provision survive these amendments? 
Section 4(8)( 1 )  excludes these expropriations from its ostensible ban on private transfers. 
But section 4(H)( I )  does not exclude them from its crippling thirty-year lease or sale 
restrictions. Does section 4(H)(I )'s failure to exempt industrial expropriations render them 
subject to its restrictions? Second, article I, section 4(8)(3) eliminates "economic 
development" as a public purpose without exempting article VI, section 2 1  's industrial 
property expropriations from its scope. Does the subsequently enacted article I, section 
4(B)(3) override article VT, section 2 1  's approval of "economic impact" as a public purpose? 
1 36. Telephone Interview with Jolm J. Marshall, supra note 37; Telephone Interview 
with Ed Blakely, supra note 44. The option of pursuing the amendment of article I, section 
4(H)( J )  by rescinding the entirety of section 4(H), see supra note 1 3 2  and accompanying 
text, met with the disagreement of those who feared that defeat of amendment number 6 
could be viewed by a court as a concession that section 4(H)( l )  does apply to section 
4(B)(2)( c ) . 
1 37 .  Ouroussoff, supra note I .  
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departure and return is the clash between New Orleans' recovery needs 
and the urban policies underlying an interpretation aligning 
Louisiana's constitutional amendments with the anti-Keio format. This 
Article's theme is that constitutional or policy reasoning that deprives 
New Orleans of an indispensable recovery tool in the wake of the 
nation's worst natural disaster affords the best evidence of its 
inadequacy. 
A. Relinking Eminent Domain-Based Urban Renewal to Substantive 
Redevelopment Goals 
One of this Article's three principal conclusions is that the Kela 
court misconceived the issue before it by framing it as an economic 
development "higher taxpayer" question. In fact, the problems the 
project was designed to address, like those identified in the UNOP 
recovery program, engage not only "economic development" but a 
broad range of conventional urban planning problems138 that 
undeniably link the alleviation o f  these problems to New London's 
deployment of its eminent domain p ower. 
A related issue should not be ignored although space limitations 
only allow its introduction in this Article. Rejuvenation of New 
London's Fort Trumbull project area was also intended to create a 
climate of confidence and citizen pride that would stimulate the 
solution of off-project physical and social planning issues associated 
with crime, education, housing abandonment, and other planning ills. 
May New London condemn property in the project area in part to 
resolve planning problems occurring elsewhere in the city ifthe project 
area is uniquely and favorably situated to contribute to the problems' 
resolution?' 39 
Under the police power, imposing burdens on an "innocent" 
parcel (and its owner) to solve a problem created by a separate 
"problem" property risks invalidation on due process or fairness 
grounds. But the eminent domain power allows expropriation as long 
as some public use warrants a parcel 's acquisition, whether or not the 
basis for the public use den"ves from a defect of the target parcel itself 
Would the vulnerability of New London's action under police power 
principles lessen or disappear because the owner of the condemned 
1 38. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
1 39. Bennan is not helpful, of course, because the boundaries of the area afflicted with 
the planning problem-the Bennan project area's status as a slum-were coextensive with 
the area within which the eminent domain power was exercised. See Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954). 
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property receives just compensation, an element that is lacking under 
the police power? 
B. The Anti-Ke Io Fo1111al" The TniJmph of Ideology and Self­
Selected Political Theory over Public Necessity and Urban 
Planning Practice 
This Article's second conclusion is that ideological or theoretical 
preconceptions insensitive to the stubborn public necessities associated 
with urban systems management are dubious sources for either 
constitutional prescriptions or urban p lanning policies. Professor Ilya 
Somin's various Keio essays, for example, are iron-willed in their 
elevation of free markets over col lective decision making in the 
redevelopment sphere and insistence that public officials who oversee 
this process will be "captured" by a cabal of realtors, private 
redevelopers, and others market actors. 14° From these two self-selected 
propositions-each, not coincidentally, a staple of libertarian 
theorizing and property rights ideology-he urges a categorical ban 
not only on economically motivated projects but on true blight 
condemnations as well. 141 
Somin candidly acknowledges that his argument "is based 
primarily on political and economic theory rather than on analysis of 
the history and text of federal and state public use clauses."142 He 
might have added that it likewise ignores urban planning theory and 
practice, spheres that however marginally illuminated by his 
ideologically driven theory, sternly resist colonization by it. His 
theoretical reasoning carries an especially daunting burden of 
persuasion because it would categorically bar New Orleans from 
expropriating and transferring to active private use a single one of its 
71,000 blighted properties, thereby shutting down the eminent domain­
based elements of the UNOP recovery plan.143 
1 40. See Somin, supm note 48, at 74; Sornin, supra note 7, at 1 83 .  
1 4 1 .  See Somin, supm note 75, at 1 942-43. 
142. Som.in, supra note 7, at 1 87-88. 
1 43.  Somin advocates unequivocally for constitutionally based, categorical bans not 
only on what he describes as "economic development" takings, but for "true blight 
condemnations." Somin, supra note 7, at 1 86. "[M]arket mechanisms can . . .  accomplish the 
goals of economic development takings without the need for eminent domain," he argues; 
"[b ]y contrast, private sector elimination of blight may sometimes be stymied by collective 
action problems requiring government intervention to overcome. My own view is that a ban 
on blight condemnations is probably desirable, even in spite of such concerns." Somin, supra 
note 75, at 1 942. This view reappears in SOJnin, supra note 7, at 27 1 .  
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Somin fails to meet this burden. His argument's conclusions do 
little more than channel its dogmatic premises-the private market's 
superiority, even in the deeply hued collective action context of urban 
redevelopment, and the inability of public officials to resist spec�al 
interest capture. When Somin's unyielding and ill-informed disdain of 
urban planning is piled atop these premises, his conclusions, of course, 
are inevitable. 144 What is missing from his assessment is what this 
Article has undertaken to provide: an evaluation of the consequences 
of his abstractions in a real world context concretized in the Article by 
New Orleans' recovery crisis.145 
144. Operating at Somin's level of sweeping generalization, one might be inclined to 
conclude with considerably greater confidence that the nation's current subprime mortgage 
and credit crises not only display the private market's self-destructive myopia, venality, and, 
perhaps, outright criminality, but have created the need for a massive infusion of public 
resources underwritten and suffered by the collective citizenry. Observing Wall Street and 
Detroit seeking-and obtaining-multibillion dollar subsidies, one winces at the irony of the 
private marketeers ' quarter-century celebration of Ronald Reagan's aphorism that the words 
"I am from the government, and I am here to help" are among the worst in the English 
language. Views in opposition to eminent domain similar to Somin's are broadcast by the 
Castle Coalition's publicists, albeit in a manner more fitting for Rush Limbaugh or Ann 
Coulter than for credible scholars. For them, eminent domain-based redevelopment is 
simplistically and repeatedly castigated as "eminent domain abuse" and as the 
unconstitutional invasion of "private property rights." See CASTLE COAL., supra note 11, 
passim. Whether or not these labels apply is the question to be answered by appropriate 
empirical and legal analysis, of course, but neither issue is genuinely engaged by Castle 
Coalition. The property rights "invasion" is simply assumed, as though constitutions-state 
and federal-have not invariably spoken to government's eminent domain power, alongside 
the police power, as an inherent limitation on private economic expectancies. The proffered 
"evidence" of eminent domain's depredations featured in the Coalition's 50 State Report 
Card, see supra note 11, is a selection of court cases and civic controversies in which public 
officials allegedly misused the eminent domain power. One might have as easily written a 
"50 State Report Card" that condemns zoning by cherry-picking similar instances of its 
actual or alleged misuse. In either case, no sensible observer would claim that these land use 
powers either are not vulnerable to abuse or have not been abused. Assuredly, however, few 
exercises of public power-land use or otherwise-would be deemed unconstitutional or 
impolitic solely on the basis of a "potential for abuse" test, as we are now rediscovering with 
the federal goverrunent's recapitalization of the nation's private banking and credit system. 
Although clearly significant, risk of abuse is only one factor that must be engaged alongside 
other considerations including the actual incidence of abusive or beneficial uses of the 
context power; the heft of the community interests being addressed; the social, political, or 
economic consequences both of action and of inaction; and the political/electoral and judicial 
processes' capacity to monitor and remedy potential abuses. Sweeping generalizations in an 
area in which the nuance of specific facts and context necessarily impact assessment are, I 
believe, treacherous. Their spurious coherence is more likely than not to have been purchased 
by their derivation from prior ideological and dogmatically theoretical premises. New 
Orleans today, however, is where the rubber hits the road in Ke/o's aftermath-hence, my 
decisions to formulate this Article as a case study and to resist sweeping generalizations that 
imperil the city's ability to wage its uphill struggle against an increasingly frightening future. 
145. When empirical investigation is essential to support Professor Somin's argument, 
it is often cavalierly advanced, if attended to at all. For example, Somin advances a key 
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Absent such an assessment, it is unclear whether or not Somin 
believes that the private market will itself resolve New Orleans' 
recovery challenge. If he does, his private market bias has apparently 
blinded him to the reality that the market has been shunning entire 
New Orleans neighborhoods since Katrina hit while awaiting effective 
governmental leadership in line with UNOP's prescriptions.  I suspect 
it more likely that Somin does not think markets will solve the 
problem, but would rather allow the problem and its evident human 
and social costs to fester than violate his ideological and supporting 
theoretical constructs. '46 
argument in support of his call for a categorical ban on blight condemnation in the following 
terms: 
[T]he fact that some centralized coercion may be desirable does not mean that the 
use of condemnation is the proper solution to the problem. Local governments 
have numerous other tools to deal with these sorts of problems, including the 
application of nuisance law, enforcement of housing codes, and the use of tax 
abatements or subsidies to encourage improvement of property. 
Somin, supra note 7, at 270. Characteristic of the similar absence of supporting investigation 
for other components of his argument, Somin advises that "[a] complete evaluation of these 
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article." Id In fact, his article provides no empirical 
investigation or evaluation of these techniques. Thoughtful observers of the urban 
development process who have examined the question empirically as it bears upon nuisance 
law and the enforcement of housing codes offer a distinctly pessimistic account of the 
effectiveness of both in the New Orleans context and, by implication, in other American 
cities. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 732-33, 739-43, 758; Marcello, supra note 4 1, at 767-
68, 795-80 1. 
146. Unpersuasively, Somin seeks to justify his advocacy for a categorical 
constitutional ban on the ground that "even in areas where there is 'real'  blight-perhaps 
especially there-the condemnation process is likely to be abused for the benefit of private 
interests at the expense of the poor and politically weak." Somin, supra note 7, at 27 1 .  That 
reasoning as well as his principal sources and the case studies to which they refer, see id. at 
268 n. 143, address eminent domain usage and practices a half-century or more out of date. 
As to the present paper's case study, perhaps Somin i s  unaware that New Orleans, like a large 
number of America's other cities suffering urban distress, has been governed by African­
American administrations for several decades now. For the failure of the Keio bench and 
anti-Keio academics like Somin to appreciate eminent domain's profound transformation 
over the last half century, see Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Keio Court and Public­
Private Economic Development, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 ,  3 - 14 (2007). A more histrionic version 
of Somin's position appears in testimony offered on behalf of Louisiana's anti-Kela measure 
by Peppi Bruneau, one of its two principal co-sponsors who also served as its floor manager 
in the Louisiana House. Mr. Bruneau condemned those who opposed the Louisiana 
measures as unsupportive of New Orleans' recovery needs and as "vultures" who must be 
prevented "from profiting from the misery of our citizens." Broadcasts of the House of 
Representatives Floor Day 32, at 3:39 (May 23,  2006), http://houselouisiana.gov/H_ 
Video/2006/May2006.htm (select "House Floor Day 32" under "May 23, 2006") (testimony 
of Rep. Peppi Bruneau). Eminent domain for any purpose-highway construction, 
redevelopment or otherwise--transforms government into "Big Brother sitting on top of you, 
eager to grind you into the dust." Id at 3: 19.  Despite his election from a Katrina-ravaged 
New Orleans legislative district, Mr. Bruneau asserted that recovery-based transfers of 
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Somin 's disappointment that many more states did not adopt 
post-Keio measures patterned on the anti-Keio format is acute.141 
Compelled by ideology and theory to explain this outcome, he 
advances a two-part response. First, recalcitrant legislators refused the 
anti-Keio format because they are subject to "capture" or perhaps were 
captured by the foregoing real estate cabal, and hence are unable or 
unwilling to do their constituents'  bidding.148 Second, the latter are 
riven by "widespread political ignorance."149 
Somin's lead claim assumes that eminent domain-based 
redevelopment will almost surely be a feckless, if not pernicious, 
enterprise. This Article disagrees and offers a case study that suggests 
that legislators who disagree with Somin-as the overwhelming 
majority have done in refusing to enact post-Keio measures aligned 
with the anti-Keio format-may perhaps have a better appreciation 
than Somin of the marketplace's limitations and of the benefits of 
public-private partnerships as stimulants to foundering neighborhoods 
and cities. Following Katrina and its destruction of their state's coastal 
areas, for example, Mississippi legislators rejected the categorical bans 
so dear to Somin (and perhaps to Louisiana legislators) in order not to 
impede their state's options in fashioning an effe ctive recovery 
program. Should we conclude, as Somin's logic dictates, that they are 
less virtuous than their Louisiana counterparts? 
C The Future of the Anti-Ke lo Format· Whither Louisiana and 
Fionaa 
My final observation is that we are only at the beginning-not 
the end-Qf the post-Keio story. The structural and interpretative 
issues detailed in this Article reappear throughout the post-Keio 
measures of many other states. Interest groups from all sides of the 
question will undoubtedly litigate aggressively to secure favored 
outcomes. State judges, many of whom once served as local officials, 
will be prepared to assume the demanding interpretative 
responsibilities that the measures '  often vague or conflicting texts 
tmpose. 
expropriated blighted property in a city suffering 71 ,000 blighted properties is an 
"abomination." See Archived Broadcasts of the House of Representatives Civil Law 
Committee Meeting 1 :09 (Mar. 21 ,  2006), http://house.Jouisiana.gov/H_ Video/2006/ 
Mar2006.htm (select "Civil Law" under "March 2 1 ,  2006"). 
1 4  7. Sornin, supra note 48, at 4. 
148. Somin, supm note 7, at 1 84, 245. 
1 49.  Somin, supnmote 48, at 4. 
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The question of greatest future interest to myself and perhaps to 
anti-Keio proponents as well is how the anti-Keio format will fare for 
those states that appear to have adopted it. Will Louisiana's highest 
court, for example, bail New Orleans out by a reading decidedly 
sympathetic to the city despite the 2006 constitutional amendments ' 
facially harsh anti-eminent domain language? Or will the court shut 
down eminent domain-based redevelopment altogether, leaving it to 
the Louisiana Legislature to reenter the picture if it so chooses? 
Florida's future course may prove even more intriguing. Florida 
will experience fierce tension between its nuclear eminent domain 
ban150 and its exposure to trends that could set the stage for eminent 
domain's more frequent use in this century. Recurrent Katrina-scale 
natural disasters are predicted to accompany planetary global warming 
and sea rise. Florida, which has already experienced many of the 
nation's most severe hurricanes, features one of the nation's largest 
riparian populations and a land mass particularly vulnerable to violent 
Gulf weather. The subprime mortgage and credit crisis now upon the 
nation will roil land markets and destabilize residential neighborhoods 
for years. From the early twentieth century forward, Florida has 
experienced legendary real estate booms and busts, and its real estate 
markets are now among the nation's most distressed. Energy shortages 
and attendant price increases will increase already strong pressure to 
reverse the patterns of suburban and exurban sprawl found throughout 
Florida's automobile-bound culture. 
Recent immigration levels in Florida and other gateway states 
rival those experienced nationwide during the 1 875- 1 9 1 5  era, which 
largely reshaped America's cities over the next half-century. 
Significant challenges will be associated with the nation's effort to 
reverse environmental overloading and contamination of its urban, 
maritime land-based systems. The Everglades' ruination only begins 
to suggest the range of Florida's land and water pollution and its 
pending water shortages. Finally, Florida claims fourteen of the 
nation's 1 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas, a number of which 
are among the nation's fastest growing regions. Cities within this 
group �uch as Jacksonville, Tampa, and Miami will not only have to 
deal with the urban reshaping consequences of the foregoing trends 
but the more familiar redevelopment challenges of the current era. 
1 50. Its constitutional provision permits the Florida legislature to waive the ban by 
"general law." See supra notes 78-80, 83-86 and accompanying text. 
2008] AMERICAN CITIES IN POST-KELO ERA 433 
In Louisiana, Florida, and other apparently strong anti-Keio 
states, ideology and academic theory will be forced to contend with 
the practical, social and ethical demands of urban systems 
management that are largely ignored by Somin and others who agree 
with him. These states truly are the "laboratories" of which Justice 
Brandeis spoke, and their "novel social and economic experiments" 
will instruct us all. 
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APPENDIX 
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 4 (2008) 
§ 4. Right to Property 
Section 4. 
(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, 
protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to 
reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the 
police power. 
Q3Xl) Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its pol i tical 
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation 
paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Except as  specifically 
authorized by Article VI, Section 2 1  of this Constitution property shall 
not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) 
for predominant use by any private person or entity; or (b) for transfer 
of ownership to any private person or entity. 
(2) As used in Subparagraph ( 1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI, 
Section 23 of this Constitution, "public purpose" shall be limited 
to the following: 
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property. 
(b) 
Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or 
more of the following objectives and uses: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
Public buildings in which publicly funded services are 
administered, rendered, or provided. 
Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and 
lands, and other public transportation, access, and 
navigational systems available to the general public. 
Drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and 
navigational protection and reclamation for the benefit 
of the public generally. 
Parks, convention centers, museums, historical 
buildings and recreational facilities generally open to 
the public. 
Public utilities for the benefit of the public generally. 
Public ports and public airports to facil itate the 
transport of goods or persons in domestic or 
international commerce. 
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( c) The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by 
the existing use or disuse of the property. 
(3) Neither economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, or 
any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in 
determining whether the taking or damaging of property is for a 
public purpose pursuant to Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph or 
Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution. 
(4) Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity 
authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and 
necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; 
in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary 
shall be a judicial question. 
( 5) In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the 
provisions of this Section, a party has the right to trial by jury to 
determine whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall 
be compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise 
provided in this Constitution, the full extent of loss shall include, 
but not be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all 
costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages 
actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation. 
(6) No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the 
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with a 
government enterprise. However, a municipality may expropriate 
a utility within its jurisdiction. 
( C) Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken. 
(D) The following property may be forfeited and disposed of in a 
civil proceeding, as provided by law: contraband drugs; property 
derived in whole or in part from contraband drugs; property used 
in the distribution, transfer, sale, felony possession, manufacture, 
or transportation of contraband drugs; property furnished or 
intended to be furnished in exchange for contraband drugs; 
property used or intended to be used to facilitate any of the above 
conduct; or other property because the above-described property 
has been rendered unavailable. 
(E) This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property 
necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes. 
(F) Further, the legislature may place limitations on the extent of 
recovery for the taking of, or loss or damage to, property rights 
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affected by coastal wetlands conservation, management, 
preservation, enhancement, creation, or restoration activities. 
(G) Compensation paid for the taking of, or loss or damage to, 
property rights for the construction, enlargement, improvement, 
or modification of federal or non-federal hurricane protection 
projects, including mitigation related thereto, shall not exceed the 
compensation required by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States of America. However, this 
Paragraph shall not apply to compensation paid for a building or 
structure that was destroyed or damaged by an event for which a 
presidential declaration of major disaster or emergency was 
issued, if the taking occurs within three years of such event. The 
legislature by law may provide procedures and definitions for the 
provisions of this Paragraph. 
(HXl) Except for leases or operation agreements for port facilities, 
highways, qualified transportation facilities or airports, the state 
or its political subdivisions shall not sell or lease property which 
has been expropriated and held for not more than thirty years 
without first offering the property to the original owner or his 
heir, or, if there is no heir, to the successor in title to the owner at 
the time of expropriation at the current fair market value, after 
which the property can only be transferred by competitive bid 
open to the general public. After thirty years have passed from the 
date the property was expropriated, the state or political 
subdivision may sell or otherwise transfer the property as 
provided by law. 
(2) Within one year after the completion of the project for which the 
property was expropriated, the state or its political subdivision 
which expropriated the property shall identify all property which 
is not necessary for the public purpose of the project and declare 
the property as surplus property. 
(3) All expropriated property identified as surplus property shall be 
offered for sale to the original owner or his heir, or, if there is no 
heir, to the successor in title to the owner at the time of 
expropriation at the current fair market value, within two years 
after completion of the project. If the original owner, heir, or 
other successor in title refuses or fails to purchase the surplus 
property within three years from completion of the project, then 
the surplus property may be offered for sale to the general public 
by competitive bid. 
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(4) After one year from the completion of the project for which 
property was expropriated, the original owner or his heir, or, if 
there is no heir, the successor in title to the owner at the time of 
expropriation may petition the state or its political subdivision 
which expropriated the property to have all or any portion of his 
property declared surplus. If the state or its political subdivision 
refuses or fails to identify all or any portion of the expropriated 
property as surplus, the original owner or the successor in title 
may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to have the 
property declared surplus. 
Amended by Acts 1989, No. 840, §1, approved Oct 7, 1989, eff. Nov. 
7, 1989; Acts 2003, No. 1295, § 1, approved Oct 4, 2003, eff. Nov. 6, 
2003; Acts 2003, No. 1304, § 1, approved Oct 4, 2003, eff. Nov. 6, 
2003; Acts 2006, No. 851, § 1, approved Sept 30, 2006, eff. Oct 31, 
2006; Acts 2006, No. 853, § 1, approved Sept JO, 2006, eff. Oct 31, 
2006; Acts 2006, No. 859, § 1, approved Sept 30, 2006, eff. Oct 31, 
2006. 
